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Medicare Payment Penalties and Safety Net Hospital Profitability: 




Objective.  To examine relationships between penalties assessed by Medicare’s Hospital Readmission 
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Data sources/study setting.  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, American Hospital Association, 
and Area Health Resource File data for 4,824 hospital-year observations.  
Study design. Bivariate and multivariate analysis of pooled cross-sectional data. 
Principal findings. Safety net hospitals have significantly higher HRRP/VBP penalties but, unlike non-
safety net hospitals, increases in their penalty rate did not significantly affect their total margins.   
Conclusions.  Safety net hospitals appear to rely on non-patient care revenues to offset higher penalties 
for the years studied.  While reassuring, these funding streams are volatile and may not be able to 
compensate for cumulative losses over time.  
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Introduction  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the Hospital Readmissions 
Reduction Program (HRRP) and the Value-Based Purchasing Program (VBP) in 2013 to incentivize 
hospitals to improve health outcomes and contain costs for Medicare beneficiaries. The HRRP assesses 
penalties on hospitals that have higher than expected risk-adjusted readmission rates for specific patient 
health conditions and procedures. The HRRP penalties were as high as 1% of Medicare base operating 
inpatient payments in 2013 and 2% in 2014. The VBP assesses penalties for poor performance on a 
broad range of metrics that span patient outcomes, processes of care, patient experience, and costs. 
The VBP also has opportunities for bonus payments if a hospital exceeds performance thresholds or 
achieves substantial improvement in metrics relative to baseline. Maximum VBP penalties and bonuses 
were 1.25% of Medicare base operating inpatient payments in both 2013 and 2014.  
Several studies have shown that hospitals treating large shares of economically disadvantaged 
patients have experienced bigger HRRP or VBP penalties when compared to other hospitals (Gilman et 
al. 2014, 2015; Gu et al. 2014; Joynt and Jha 2013; Sheingold, Zuckerman, and Shartzer 2016, Thompson 
et al. 2017). This higher penalty burden has raised concern that risk adjustment methods employed by 
the HRRP and VBP may not adequately account for the complexity and costs of treating 
socioeconomically vulnerable patients, and thus, lead to excessive financial penalties for hospitals 
treating these populations (Gilman et al. 2015; Sheingold, Zuckerman and Shartzer 2016; Thompson et 
al. 2017).  Concern has also been expressed that HRRP and VBP programs might deepen disparities in 
care since hospitals typically rely on internal resources when implementing strategies to improve patient 
outcomes and care delivery (Gilman et al. 2015; Woolhandler and Himmelstein 2015).  
Our objective was to move beyond earlier studies demonstrating differences in HRRP and VBP 
penalties across hospitals to assess the combined impact these programs have had on overall hospital 
financial performance. Specifically, we examined the relationship between changes in combined HRRP 
and VBP penalties and the operating and total margins for different types of hospitals. Operating 
margins reflect the extent to which hospitals generate net revenues from their main line of business, 
direct patient care. Total margins account for additional net revenues from sources such as charitable 
contributions, public appropriations, government transfers, investment income, and income from 
subsidiaries or affiliates. While non-patient revenues may be more accessible to hospitals treating 
economically disadvantaged patients, these funds may not be sufficient to compensate for losses due to 
HRRP and VBP penalties.    
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   Several sources of publicly available CMS data were brought together to construct key variables 
for this study (CMS 2012, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). These include annual CMS files for: the HRRP and VBP 
penalty rates, the CMS hospital cost report that includes financial statements to construct financial 
ratios, and the CMS Impact File.  All CMS data files and the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual 
Survey contain Medicare Provider Identification number and were merged based on this identifier. In 
some instances, the AHA data lacked Medicare Provider numbers and we used the American Hospital 
Directory (www.ahd.com) to obtain this information. Finally, we used the county FIPs codes in the AHA 
data to merge county-level Area Health Resource File data. In total, 4,824 hospital-year observations 
with complete data were analyzed, representing 2,720 unique hospitals 
We calculated the combined HRRP and VBP penalty rate assessed on each hospital for the two 
study years. If hospitals earned a VBP bonus, we treated the bonus as if it were a “negative” penalty. 
Specifically, if a hospital had a 0.5% HRRP penalty and a 0.3% VBP bonus, the combined penalty rate 
would be 0.2% for the year. This simple summing of the penalty/bonus rates was appropriate because 
both are applied to a hospital’s Medicare base operating inpatient payments when determining 
payment adjustments for the two programs.  We also estimated the hospital’s annual dollar penalty 
amount given the combined penalty rate and our estimate of Medicare base operating inpatient 
payments for a hospital. The technical appendix provides details on the calculation of the annual dollar 
penalty amount.   
 We identified safety net hospitals treating a disproportionate share of economically 
disadvantaged patients in two ways. First, following recent studies, we identified hospitals in each study 
year that had a Medicare DSH index in the top quartile and identified these as High-DSH (Gilman et al. 
2014, 2015; Joynt and Jha 2014; Thompson et al. 2017).  Second, AHA data were used to categorize 
hospitals by ownership type: non-federal public, voluntary non-profit, and for-profit. Public hospitals, 
which are typically operated by state, county, or local governments, have a legal mandate to treat all 
individuals regardless of insurance status.  Many prior research studies have considered public hospitals 
to be a critical component of local health care safety nets (Bazzoli et al. 2012; Gaskin, Hadley and 
Freeman 2001; Hadley and Cunningham 2004; Needleman and Ko 2012). 
To compare our results with those of earlier studies, we first constructed descriptive statistics, 
comparing HRRP/VBP penalty rates and penalty dollar amounts across various types of hospitals. Next, 
multivariate analysis of operating and total margins was conducted. Two sets of models were estimated: 
the first examining High-DSH versus not and the second focusing on the ownership classification. The 
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(1) Yht = β1 + β2HRRP/VBP Penaltyht + β3HRRP/VBP Penaltyht*HospTypeht + β4Hht + β5Mht + δ1
 δ
Year2014 +  
2Year2014*HospTypeht + ε
where Y
ht   
ht was either operating margin or total margin for hospital h in year t; HRRP/VBP was the 
combined penalty rate, which enters directly and with interactions by hospital type (namely, High-DSH 
in the first version of the models and ownership type, with non-profit status as the reference category, 
in the second version of the models); Hht was a vector of hospital characteristics, Mht was a vector of 
market characteristics; Year2014 was a year fixed effect that is entered directly and with interactions by 
hospital type; εht
A wide range of hospital and market control variables commonly used in analysis of hospital 
financial performance (Bai and Anderson 2015) was included as control variables in the multivariate 
analysis. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on these and other study variables. Most variables are self-
explanatory but a few require further description.  Operating margin was calculated as revenues from 
operating sources minus operating expenses, divided by operating revenues. Total margin was 
calculated as total revenues from all operating and non-operating sources minus all hospital expenses, 
divided by total revenues. Teaching hospitals were defined as those having one or more approved 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education physician residency programs. The tertiary 
services variable represented a sum of hospital self-reported AHA Annual survey responses about 
whether a hospital provided any of 43 services considered to be high-tech, as initially identified in 
Bazzoli et al. (1999) and modified to reflect changes in service questions in the Annual Survey. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of hospital concentration was based on hospital organization market share 
of admissions in a county, where we combined admissions for those hospitals in a county that belonged 
to the same multihospital system. 
 was a random error term; and β and δ were estimated parameters.  
Ordinary Least Squares was used to analyze the pooled 2013 and 2014 hospital data with robust 
standard errors to account for those hospitals that contributed two observations to the sample. 
Estimated parameters were then used to simulate how operating and total margins would change for 
different hospital groups as the HRRP/VBP penalty rate increased from the overall sample average of 
0.28% to twice this value at 0.56%. The simulations created predicted values of the financial margins by 
treating all hospitals in the sample as if they were of a certain type (i.e., High-DSH versus not; public 
versus non-profit versus for-profit) but allowing other model covariates to retain their original values. 
These predicted values were then averaged over the entire hospital sample to obtain ceteris paribus 
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sensitivity analysis using the 25th and 75th
Study Results 
 percentiles of the combined HRRP/VBP penalty rate 
distribution to assess the sensitivity of our results to baseline assumptions.  Bootstrapping with a 
replication sample of 300 was used to obtain estimates of the standard errors of the differences in 
predicted values of the financial measures at the lower and higher  penalty rate levels, which allowed us 
to assess the statistical significance of the change in these predictions for each hospital type.   
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the combined penalty rates and estimated annual 
penalty adjustments for the different hospital types. Consistent with existing studies, we found that 
High-DSH and public hospitals had significantly higher average penalty rates (.43% and .33%, 
respectively) relative to other hospital types. For High-DSH hospitals, this translated into significantly 
higher annual penalty assessments relative to not High-DSH hospitals, both overall and per hospital bed. 
Our estimates of the combined penalty amounts for High-DSH hospitals of $139,212 per year and $429 
per staffed bed were consistent with those of Gilman et al. (2015), who found that 2014 average penalty 
assessments for High-DSH hospitals were $115,900 per year and $436 per staffed bed.  
Our multivariate regression models (Table A in the technical appendix) yielded negative and 
highly significant associations between the main HRRP/VBP penalty rate and both operating and total 
margins.  For safety net hospital categories defined as High-DSH or public, these negative associations 
were partially offset by significant positive interactions with the HRRP/VBP penalty rate variable  in the 
total margin models.   
Figure 1 presents predicted operating margins for different hospital groups, first assuming the 
overall sample average penalty rate of .28% (grey bars) and then for the rate of .56% (black bars). As 
noted above, these estimates hold other factors of the multivariate model constant, including a 
hospital’s Medicare payer share. Predicted operating margins fell by a similar amount (1.2 to 1.8 
percentage points) across the hospital types. These declines were statistically significant at the p<.05 
level for each hospital category. The operating margin declines, although similar, differ in actual value 
across categories because our HRRP/VBP variable is a percent of Medicare base operating revenues 
rather than a dollar amount or a percent of hospital total revenues.  
Figure 2 reports predicted total margins for the different hospital groups, again at the average 
penalty rate for the entire sample (grey bars) and for the rate of .56% (black bars). In this case, doubling 
the combined penalty rate led to a statistically significant decline in total margins for the not High-DSH, 
not-for-profit, and for-profit hospital categories. These declines were slightly smaller in magnitude 
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points, respectively). However, the predicted declines in total margin for the High-DSH and public 
hospital categories were small and not statistically significant.  Appendix Tables B and C report our 
sensitivity analysis results using different base rates from the HRRP/VBP distribution and yielded the 
same pattern of results and significance for resulting changes in operating and total margins.   
Discussion 
Although predicted operating margins declined significantly for all hospital groups with an 
increase in the HRRP/VBP penalty rate, we did not find statistically significant declines in total margin for 
hospital categories normally considered safety net hospitals. These discrepant changes between 
operating margins on the one hand and total margins on the other imply that, at least for the two years 
studied, safety net hospitals relied on non-patient revenues to fill financial gaps created by higher 
HRRP/VBP penalties. Forms of non-patient revenues include charitable contributions, public 
appropriations, government transfers, investment income, and income from subsidiaries or affiliates. 
Research has shown that hospitals have historically used non-operating revenues to offset financial 
losses from patient care (Singh and Song 2013); our analysis suggests that these sources were likely very 
important to safety net hospitals when losses arose from the HRRP/VBP programs. 
 Our results suggest that the HRRP/VBP penalties may not have created the financial hardship for 
safety net hospitals that so many had feared, at least not in initial program years. As noted by Gilman et 
al. (2015) and consistent with our findings in Table 2, the overall size of combined HRRP and VBP 
penalties was small, and from that perspective, it was most likely straightforward to identify other 
sources of revenues to fill gaps. However, it is important to recognize that funds used to shore up 
financial performance may have been diverted from important activities that address community needs, 
such as programs for the uninsured or homeless, local health promotion, and other types of community 
benefit programs. Additionally, safety net hospitals have faced large negative operating margins over 
time and consistently high HRRP/VBP penalties (Bazzoli, Fareed and Waters 2014; Thompson et al. 
2017). Thus, short-term actions taken by these hospitals may not ameliorate potential long-term 
financial harm that result from these penalties.  This is especially important given the uncertain future of 
Medicaid reimbursement and DSH funding and also potential growth in the number of uninsured if 
major parts of the Affordable Care Act are repealed or allowed to fail.     
 Finally, even if safety net hospitals continue to be able to patch together non-patient care 
revenues to fill financial voids from HRRP and VBP, other concerns remain. The primary intent of value-
based programs is to promote better care for patients; their effectiveness may be reduced if hospitals 
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to improving performance on value-based metrics. These financial workarounds, though helpful to 
hospitals in sustaining themselves or as a response to the complex design of some pay-for-performance 
programs, may under-cut the incentives that these performance programs attempt to instill. 
Our analysis has certain limitations that must be recognized.  First, we used secondary data with 
well acknowledged issues. The hospital financial data we analyzed came from Medicare cost reports and 
only receive desk reviews by CMS. Thus they may have data quality problems (Kane and Magnus 2001; 
Magnus and Smith 2000). We examined several years of financial performance that extended back to 
2009 to assess trends and to identify and eliminate observations with extremely low or high margins so 
they would not distort results. Hospital data reported in the AHA Annual Survey and CMS cost reports 
are self-reported and thus subject to measurement error. Our analysis was limited to only two years of 
data (2013 and 2014) given reporting lags for some data sources, especially delays in the reporting of 
CMS hospital cost report data used to construct financial ratios.  A longer time series may be able to 
shed additional light on whether safety net hospitals rely on non-patient revenues over time to insulate 
themselves from accumulating HRRP/VBP penalties.  
Our findings add to the growing consensus about the need for better risk adjustment of HRRP 
and VBP to account for patient socioeconomic factors so that hospitals have meaningful and achievable 
performance targets. This will be increasingly important as the value-based purchasing movement 




Bai G. and G.F. Andersen. 2016. “A More Detailed Understanding of Factors Associated with Hospital 
Profitability.” Health Affairs (Millwood). 35(5):889-97. 
 
Bazzoli, G.J., N. Fareed, and T.M. Waters. 2014. "Hospital Financial Condition in the Recent Recession 
and Implications for Institutions That Remain Financially Weak." Health Affairs (Millwood). 33(May): 
739-744.  
 
Bazzoli, G.J., W. Lee, HM Hsieh, and LR Mobley. 2012, “The Effects of Safety Net Hospital Closures and 

















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
 
Bazzoli G.J., S. M. Shortell, N. Dubbs, C. Chan C, and P. Kralovec. 1999. “A Taxonomy of Healthcare 
Networks and Systems: Bringing Order Out of Chaos. Health Services Research 33(1):1683-1717.  
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 2012. “Acute Inpatient PPS. Historical impact files 




Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 2016. “Acute Inpatient PPS, Hospital Readmissions 




Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 2017a. “Hospital Value Based Purchasing.” [accessed 
on July 5, 2017]. Available at:  https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/hospital-value-based-purchasing/index.html?redirect=/hospital-value-based-purchasing. 
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 2017b. “Acute Inpatient PPS. FFY2017 IPPS Final 




 Gaskin, DJ, J. Hadley, J, and V.G. Freeman. 2001. “Are Urban Safety Net Hospitals Losing Low-Risk 
Medicaid Maternity Patients?” Health Services Research 36(February, Part I): 25-51. 
 
Gilman M., E.K. Adams, J.M. Hockenberry, I.B. Wilson, A.S. Milstein, and E.R. Becker. 2014. “California 
Safety-Net hospitals Likely to Be penalized by ACA Value, Readmission, and Meaningful Use Programs.” 

















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
Gilman M., J.M. Hockenberry, E.K. Adams, A.S. Milstein, I.B. Wilson, and E.R. Becker. 2015. “The 
Financial Effect of Value-Based Purchasing and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program on Safety-
Net Hospitals in 2014: A Cohort Study.” Annals of Internal Medicine 163(6):427-36.   
  
Gu Q., L. Koenig, J. Faerberg, C.R. Steinberg, C. Vaz, and M.P.Wheatley. 2014. “The Medicare Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program: Potential Unintended Consequences for Hospitals Serving Vulnerable 
Populations.” Health Services Research 49(3):818-37.  
 
Hadley, J. and P. Cunningham. 2004. “Availability of Safety Net Providers and Access to Care of 
Uninsured Persons,” Health Services Research 39(October): 1527-1546. 
 
Joynt K.E. and A.K. Jha. 2013. “Characteristics of Hospitals Receiving Penalties Under the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program.” Journal of the American Medical Association 309(4): 342-3. 
 
Kane, N.M. and S.A. Magnus. 2001. “The Medicare Cost Report and the Limits of Hospital Accountability: 
Improving Financial Accounting Data,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 26(February): 81-105. 
 
Magnus, S.A. and D.G. Smith. 2000. “Better Medicare Cost Report Data Are Needed to Help Hospitals 
Benchmark Costs and Performance,” Health Care Management Review 25(Fall): 65-76. 
 
Needleman, J. and M. Ko. 2012. “The Declining Public Hospital Sector,” in The Health Safety Net in a 
Post-Health Care Reform World, M. Hall and S. Rosenbaum (eds), Piscataway, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, pages 200-216. 
 
Sheingold S.H., R. Zuckerman and A. Shartzer A. 2016. “Understanding Medicare Hospital Readmission 
Rates and Differing Penalties between Safety-Net and Other Hospitals.” Health Affairs (Millwood) 
35(1):124-31.   
 
Singh S.R. and P.H. Song, PH. 2013. “Nonoperating Revenue and Hospital Financial Performance: Do 
Hospitals Rely on Income from Nonpatient Care Activities to Offset Losses on Patient Care?” Health Care 
















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
 
Thompson M.P., T.M. Waters, C.M. Kaplan, Y. Cao and G.J. Bazzoli. 2017. “Most Hospitals Received 
Annual Penalties for Excess Readmissions, But Some Fared Better Than Others.” Health Affairs 
(Millwood) 36(5): 893-901.  
 
Woolhandler S. and D.U. Himmelstein. 2015. “Collateral Damage: Pay-for-Performance Initiatives and 



















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Hospital Sample: Hospital-Year Observations 
(Mean values with standard deviations in parentheses) 
Variable DSH Status Ownership Type 
 High-DSH Not High-DSH Not-for-Profit For-Profit Public 
Hospital Financial 
Performance 
     






















Hospital Characteristics      
    Proportion Teaching
a,b















1 0 0 





0 1 0 
    Proportion Public
a




0 0 1 



































































Market Characteristics      
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    # of observations 1,194 3,630 3,262 922 640 
NOTES: DSH = Disproportionate Share Hospital   
aSignificant difference between High-DSH and not High-DSH at p<.05.   
b
 
Significant difference between ownership categories at p<.05. 
Table 2:  Combined HRRP and VBP Penalty Statistics by Hospital DSH Status and Ownership Type: Mean 
Values 
 
Variable DSH Status Ownership Type 
 High-DSH Not High-DSH Not-for-Profit For-Profit Public 
Penalty Information  
* 
    




0.23% 0.27% 0.27% 0.33% 
Annual dollar amount of 




$76,247 $104,368 $54,980 $81,384 
Annual dollar amount of 
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NOTES: HRRP=Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, VBP=Value-Based Program, 
DSH=Disproportionate Share Hospital. Total n=4,824. 
 
a Significant difference between High-DSH and not High-DSH at p<.05 
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Figure 1: Predicted Operating Margins with Simulated Penalty Rate Increase 
 
Difference -1.2%a -1.8%a -1.6%a -1.7%a -1.3%a 
 
NOTES: DSH=Disproportionate Share Hospital, NFP=voluntary not-for-profit hospital, FP=for-profit hospital, Public=non-federal government 
hospital.  
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Figure 2: Predicted Total Margins with Simulated Penalty Rate Increase 
 
Difference -0.4% -1.4%a -1.3%a -1.2%a -0.6% 
NOTES: DSH=Disproportionate Share Hospital, NFP=voluntary not-for-profit hospital, FP=for-profit hospital, Public=non-federal government 
hospital.  
 














Figure 1: Predicted Operating Margins with Simulated Penalty Rate Increase 
 
Difference -1.2%a -1.8%a -1.6%a -1.7%a -1.3%a 
 
NOTES: DSH=Disproportionate Share Hospital, NFP=voluntary not-for-profit hospital, FP=for-profit 
hospital, Public=non-federal government hospital.  
aChange in predicted operating margin is significant at the p<.05 level based on bootstrapped standard 



















Figure 2: Predicted Total Margins with Simulated Penalty Rate Increase 
 
Difference -0.4% -1.4%a -1.3%a -1.2%a -0.6% 
NOTES: DSH=Disproportionate Share Hospital, NFP=voluntary not-for-profit hospital, FP=for-profit hospital, Public=non-federal government 
hospital.  
 
aChange in predicted total margin is significant at the p<.05 level based on bootstrapped standard errors of estimates.  
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